The SEC recently sanctioned independent broker-dealer 1st Discount Brokerage, Inc. for supervisory violations. In addition to the firm, a principal was also named and charged. In a nutshell, a broker at the firm defrauded investors by operating a ponzi scheme in which he allegedly took more than $8.6 million from 28 investors during the period from 2001 to 2008. The SEC staff alleged that 1DB failed reasonably to supervise that broker (Michael Park) with a view towards preventing his violations. According to the SEC action, Park pled guilty to wire and mail fraud charges and was sentenced to 96 months in prison.
The SEC identified several issues in which the firm's policies and procedures were lacking; deficiencies that the SEC alleged could have led to the discovery of Park's misconduct. The SEC alleged that the firm failed to have reasonable policies and procedures in place to review the DBA (doing business as) accounts of Park. Had they done so, the Commission argues, they would have seen an influx of money into his business account through which he conducted his ponzi, and would have seen entries in such account marks as "initial stock purchase" or "liquidation of account" that would have raised red flags. Another alleged deficiency related to failing to have reasonable policies or procedures in place requiring compliance auditors to review compliance audit reports from previous years, and failures to conduct unannounced compliance audits as required by the firm's compliance and sales management manual. In addition, the SEC found that had a reasonable review of Park's activities been conducted, inquiry into his dramatically declining commissions could have revealed that Park's customers were "closing and/or liquidating their accounts in order to invest with Park's other business, a Ponzi scheme."
1DB is an independent contractor model broker-dealer, as opposed to a traditional centralized branch office wirehouse model firm. In this action, it seems that the SEC is either seeking to pronounce a new supervision standard for such firms, or perhaps it merely mistakenly referred to the SEC's earlier supervision statements in the Royal Alliance case. I didn't catch this at first blush, and can't take credit for it. But I do want to share the comments on this case I received from my friend and former colleague at NASD, Alan Wolper (Alan is a partner with Locke Lord in Chicago). With his permission to share this with my readers, here's Alan's comments to me on this matter:
On page 4, in paragraph 6, you will find the SEC’s seemingly throw-away observation that the respondent firm, 1st Discount, employed an independent contractor broker model, “which requires greater supervision than that of a traditional wire house brokerage firm.“ (My emphasis.) Interestingly, the SEC cites as support for this statement the Royal Alliance case from 1997, which I’m sure you remember because it was one of the first cases that discussed the SEC’s preference for “unannounced” branch audits. But, nowhere in Royal Alliance did the SEC go so far as it did here. In Royal Alliance, the SEC merely stated that a model consisting of offices of one or two RRs, spread out geographically across the country, “necessarily entail[s] greater supervisory challenges.” The SEC did NOT state that the independent contractor model required greater supervision than other models. Indeed, to the contrary, the Royal Alliance order expressly recites that the SEC “requires firms organized in such a fashion [i.e., independent contractor RRs, in small offices around the country], and individual supervisors at those firms, to meet the same high standards of supervision as at more traditionally organized firms.” Perhaps the English major in me is coming out, and I am splitting hairs by seeing a distinction between the phrase “greater supervision” in the 1st Discount settlement and the phrase “greater supervisory challenges” in Royal Alliance, but, seems to me that this may, in fact, represent a major change in the how supervision is viewed by the SEC: instead of requiring you to meet the SAME supervisory standards as traditional firms, now, by virtue of your business model, the SEC will be holding you to a higher standard.
If so, that is simply wrong. The standard – for all BDs – is still merely reasonable supervision. Granted, HOW firms meet that standard will vary from firm to firm, based on their particular circumstances. But…to state that independent contractor firms require “greater supervision” than traditional wire houses, well, that is more than troubling.
I think Alan is right. There should be but one standard of supervision for all broker-dealers, and that standard is, or should be, reasonable supervision. And that standard should not change based on the model of business through which a broker-dealer operates If it is changing, that it troubling. Should the SEC be of the view that an independent model firm be required to adhere to a higher degree of care in its supervision, then it would be more appropriate to set forth such standard through the rule-making process, rather than to legislate through enforcement action.
All independent model firms should be well aware of both FINRA and the SEC's interest in branch audits and that there have been many disciplinary cases related to inadequate inspections of offices. I'll conclude this post with Alan's final comments to me, the advice he'd share with his clients:
The lesson here is clear: more than ever, as an independent contractor model BD, you may be called upon to defend the efficacy of your supervisory system, particularly your branch audit program, in the context of a FINRA or SEC exam. So don’t wait for the examiners to show up to take a look at your WSPs, your branch audit schedule, the content of your audit questionnaires/modules, etc. We all know how tough the regulators are these days. Don’t make their jobs easy by disregarding the warnings they have plainly given.
Wise words, indeed.
